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different from what was due under the contract, the guarantor might be
able to show new consideration and therefore a release because of ac-
cord and satisfaction.
3. The fact that plaintiff did not file its claim against the estate of
the agent, is in no way a bar to it recovering from the guarantor. By his
contract, the guarantor became primarily liable for whatever money
might be due and owing under the terms of the contract. The plaintiff
elected to collect from the guarantor and such election was within the
privilege of their contract.
In the case of Loverin and Brown Co. v. Travis, 135 Wis. 332, it is
held that where a guaranty is one of payment and not of mere collection,
no efforts to collect from the debtor are necessary before making demand
on the guarantor. See also Minter v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala.
762; Bull v. Doe, 77 Cal. 54; and Willis v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617.
SYLVESTER S. SANGER
Intoxicating Liquor: Search and Seizure: Preliminary Hearing
In thumbing over recent decisions reported in the Federal Reporter
advance sheets, we find many of the cases have come up as a result
of someone violating the prohibition law. Most of us are wholly un-
familiar with the operation of the law in the prosecution and the defense
of these liquor violators, so a typical case has been singled from among
a number of such decisions and a report thereon is herewith given so
that we may have at least a faint recollection of coming in contact with
the subject. There is a marked similarity among all the cases in this
field, for after all, they usually arise out of similar circumstances. The
case under discussion is Herter v. United States, 33 Fed. 400, and 33 Fed.
402.
To make a long story short and to start at the end and work toward
the starting of the action, Herter's house was raided by agents by virtue
of a search warrant issued by one Jackson who was the United States
Federal Prohibition Director for the district of Montana. As a result
of this raid, there was delivered up to Jackson and placed in his care,
456 quarts of beer, three quarts of wine, one pint of whiskey, and
various pieces of personal property, such as, copper boilers, copper
buckets, steins, etc. Herter contends that the issuance of the warrant
was void and that as there is to be no action taken on the seizure that
he is entitled to have his property returned to him. He appears in Fed-
eral Court petitioning it to order Jackson to return his property. Here is
the story that is presented to the court:
Adams, an undercover agent of the government, went to the dwelling
of Herter and represented himself as being an attorney in search of the
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heirs of a certain Herter. During his visit he was treated to several
helpings of beer (served in the decorative steins that are now in the
custody of Jackson) but he was unable to buy any beer although he had
expressed a desire to do so. Adams filed an affidavit with his chief to
the effect that he knew the reputation of Herter and his dwelling and
that he believed that Herter sold intoxicating liquors on the place. He
further stated that he visited -the place and had imbibed in liquor that
was probably intoxicating but had not been able to buy any. He had
further exacted a half promise from Herter to the effect that he might
be able to buy some on the morrow.
Comes now Dibble, the government's second undercover man in this
case. This agent hired a cab and drove to the scene of action. He was
told by the driver that there would be no chances of getting any liquor
unless he (the driver) went in alone. So the driver leaves his cab and
starts for the house with Dibble trailing in the shadow. But Dibble was
unable to get close enough to hear much of the conversation. He did
hear Herter say "I'm sorry that I haven't anything today for your party
but expect to have some tomorrow and will let you have some then."
Dibble made out his affidavit to this effect and the warrant was issued
on the strength of the two affidavits.
Not having sufficient information to go ahead with the prosecution the
district attorney has informed the court that it does not intend to prose-
cute Herter. The question before the court now is, can Herter get back
the property seized on the ground that it was an illegal search and
seizure?
As a matter of law the court decided that the information furnished
in .the two affidavits was sufficient to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. There being a valid warrant, plaintiff cannot recover his prop-
erty on the ground of illegal search and seizure. But the court finds
power to entertain the plaintiff's petition and to return the boilers, kettles
and steins (which might have a legitimate use) in the statutes,' wherein
search warrants are authorized, with the provision that: "Such liquor,
the containers thereof, and such property so seized shall be subject to
such disposition as the court may make thereof. If it is found that such
liquor or property was so unlawfully used, the liquor and all property
designed for the unlawful manufacture of liquor, shall be destroyed,
unless the court shall otherwise order." So the plaintiff is awarded
his pots, kettles, and steins.
It is interesting to note that two months after the first raid, Herter's
house was again raided and certain stores of liquor seized. The warrant
'Sec. 25 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 315, 27 U.S.C.A.
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was issued in this instance on an affidavit of one Sharp who stated posi-
tively -that he had purchased- intoxicating liquor from the appellant at
his residence on September 24. At the preliminary hearing before the
commissioner, Herter brought in twelve good men who swore that they
had seen him at various places on the twenty-fourth and that for that
reason the affidavit of Sharp must be false. The commissioner decided
that the affidavit might have been incorrect and that the preponderance
of evidence showed that no intoxicating liquor was served to Sharp on
the day in question. The commissioner ordered the warrant quashed
and the evidence obtained thereunder suppressed. As to disposing of
the liquor seized, the commissioner left that to the court.
At the trial, Herter objected to the introduction of any evidence ob-
tained under the warrant, not on the ground that the warrant was void
but solely because of the ruling of the commissioner at the preliminary
hearing. But the court found that the decision of the commissioner was
not binding as a matter of law and that therefore the evidence was
properly admitted and the conviction sustained.
JOHN J. McRAE
Parties: Service of Process: Witnesses: Non-Resident
It appears to be well established that service of process on witnesses
or parties from foreign states while in attendance in the court in which
the cause is pending, is invalid.
In Harvey v. Harvey et al. Wis. 225 N.W. 703, the defendants, resi-
dents of Ohio, came to Milwaukee at the request of a party to an action
then pending in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County. They were
prepared to testify as witnesses, if necessary. While in attendance, the
defendants in Harvey v. Harvey et al., supra, were each served with a
summons. The lower court, passing on the motion, set aside such serv-
ice on the ground that the defendants were exempt from service while
attending court within the state.
The basis of the appellant's argument was that the general rule of
privilege does not apply to witnesses or parties not necessarily in at-
tendance. But the court was of the opinion that as a matter of public
policy non-resident witnesses or parties shall be exempt from service of
process upon them which seeks to subject them to liability while they
are attending court in another state.
The decisions are all in accord in declaring that witnesses or parties
from a foreign state who are necessarily in attendance on a court are
immune from the service of a summons while so within the state.1
'Kaufi~zan v. Kennedy, 25 Fed. 785; Skinner and Mounce Co. v. Waite, 155
Fed. 828; Cameron v. Roberts, 87 Wis. 291, 58 N.W. 376; Rix v. Sprague, 157 Wis.
